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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 276 
Accident time: 12:50 Accident Date: 15/04/2000 
Where it occurred: Cordon Sanitaire, 
Mozambique border 
Country: Zimbabwe 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 15/04/2000 
ID original source: J.Morrissey Name of source: Mounser 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast Ground condition: soft 
woodland (bush) 
Date record created: 18/02/2004 Date  last modified: 18/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
 
Accident report 
A limited accident report was made available by the programme manager in January 2001.  
Documents of any kind were only provided after pressure had been applied through the 
funder. To try to counter any omissions in the reports provided, statements were taken from a 
field supervisor and the field Doctor in March 2001. The following summarises the content of 
the report provided and includes detail from statements. 
At the time of this accident the demining company operated in one-man teams using a one-
man drill [from the start of 2000 this drill was adopted]. In this a single deminer looks for 
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tripwires, cuts undergrowth, uses the detector and excavates finds. The group issued frontal 
protection and their drills assumed that the deminer would kneel or squat while excavating. 
The report stated that at “12:50 on 15 April 2000, [the victim] detonated a mine whilst 
conducting clearance in the Cordon Sanitaire Minefield”. When the casualty was recovered 
from the minefield and tended by the paramedic, it was found that he was conscious and had 
sustained only minor injuries.” The victim arrived at the site medical unit at 13:05 and the field 
doctor arrived “immediately afterwards”. The victim sustained superficial burns to his left “arm 
and forearm. A minor contusion also developed on his left wrist.” [Apparently, he was not 
taken to a hospital.] 
The internal investigators began a site-examination at 13:18. They found that the accident 
occurred within the first row of mines on the Zimbabwean side of the Cordon Sanitaire. The 
victim was working in a “boxed” area in which all mines on the first row had been found and 
destroyed for 22m. He was finishing the last three metres of the first row when the accident 
occurred. 
The investigators recorded that marking was clearly visible and the vegetation removed. The 
ground had been prepared by a D6 (which pushed over trees) and a vegetation mulcher. The 
ground conditions were “good for demining” with a relatively level soft surface. Water had not 
been used on the detector reading under investigation at the time of the accident, although it 
had been used in areas cleared earlier. 
The victim was wearing his PPE. His detector, adjusted correctly, was behind him. His 
prodder, with a hand-guard, was approximately two metres behind the accident site. His 
trowel was located slightly to the right of the crater. His visor was in the crater. There were 
blast marks on the visor. From the shape of the crater, the investigators concluded that the 
mine was buried and that the blast was directed away from the deminer. They found “no 
evidence of excavation”.  
The crater had a sharp leading edge, and t he forward edge sloped away. The investigators 
thought that the angle of the ground, which sloped downward away from the victim, would 
create such a crater. The crater was recorded as being approximately 20cm in width and 
between 8 and 10 cm deep. The mine fragments found in the crater were from an R2M2 and 
it was noted that the other mines in the area had been M969s.  
“Medical coverage was immediately available on site. A paramedic was in an ambulance… at 
the control point approximately 300m from the accident area. A qualified Medical Orderly was 
also located directly at the area where the accident occurred.” 
 
Conclusions 
The investigators came to the following conclusions: 
“a) The accident happened during prodding. 
b) Again a model R2M2 mine was involved in the accident. Prodding accidents so far mainly 
involve this mine model. It appears this was the only R2M2 among M969 mines. 
c) All marking was correct. 
d) All machines had been calibrated correctly. 
e) The protective equipment served its purpose very well. In fact, it probably saved the 
individual’s life. The visor and apron prevented any blast material from entering the face and 
body. 
f) Communications proved to be adequate at the time of the accident. 
g) Suspension of operations within the other Crews was well co-ordinated and controlled.” 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators decided that the “accident was unfortunate”. They found that all procedures 
appeared to have been conducted correctly and no evidence pointed towards deminer 
negligence.  
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With the aim of further enhancing safety, the following recommendations were made: 
“a) The crew revises pin-pointing and prodding techniques. 
b) All personnel working in the Cordon, particularly around washouts and animal fences, be 
regularly informed of the possibility of encountering R2M2 mines. 
c) The prodding drill be removed from the standard demining procedure 
d) Constant reminders to deminers on the importance of correct use of PPE. 
e) The application of water before prodding be vigorously enforced.” 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 351 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not applicable 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 





No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems that the victim 
was working properly and obeying his SOPs when the accident occurred. 
The accident was investigated by the group’s own field manager, but seems to have been 
done with professionalism. Despite his inability to identify a cause, he recommended 
reinforcing SOPs that had proved effective. 
The victim was working on a downward slope. This is believed to be dangerous by many 
groups. Generally, deminers are required to clear a safe lane that allows them to work up any 
slope there may be. The failure of the management group to ensure that the deminers worked 
up any slope may have been a contributory factor. However, if the investigators were right 
and the slope did lead to the blast being directed away from the victim, it may have been 
safer to work downhill in that situation. 
The accident investigation is considered inadequate because it was edited prior to being 
made available. 
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